Hezbollah's Radwan Unit 'unfit' to carry out large-scale invasion into Israel

According to data collected by the Alma Center, the Radwan Unit was rendered unfit, at least temporarily, to launch a large-scale invasion into northern Israel.

Since Hezbollah joined the Israel-Hamas war and until the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, Hezbollah suffered a ‘fatal blow,’ Tal Beeri, Head of the Research Department at the Alma Center for the Study of Security Challenges in the North, wrote in an analysis published Wednesday.

The analysis, titled "Radwan Unit: The elimination of its operatives teaches about attempts to return to the South Litani and rebuild operational readiness," focused on IDF operations against the Radwan unit during the war and the organization's conduct since the ceasefire.

Devastating blow to Radwan Unit

Beeri estimated that after the attacks, the Radwan Unit was rendered unfit, at least temporarily, to carry out its central mission of launching a large-scale invasion into northern Israel.

“Even the chance of a more limited invasion, of 'only' dozens or 'only' a few hundred operatives, is extremely low," he wrote.

Since the ceasefire, according to the data collected by the center, 108 Hezbollah operatives have been documented and confirmed as killed from open sources. Of these, 13 operatives, about 12%, were from the Radwan Unit.

The Radwan unit's return south of the Litani

Beeri noted that this is a high percentage relative to the size of the unit within the total military force of Hezbollah, adding that "All 13 operatives of the Radwan Unit who were killed since the ceasefire were eliminated in the area south of the Litani River ('Area 1701')."

"The first confirmed killing of an operative from the Radwan Unit, according to open-source materials, occurred on March 4, 2025,” Beeri wrote, adding that the unit began making its return to the area south of the Litani River “no later than three months after the ceasefire began."

"It seems that in the first months following the ceasefire, and in light of the damage done to it, the Radwan Unit lowered its profile and may have physically distanced itself from southern Lebanon, with an emphasis on the area south of the Litani River," he explained.

The analysis detailed the process of rebuilding and regaining strength that the unit has begun implementing, explaining that operatives have begun carrying out recovery and rebuilding actions, “including re-establishing their presence in southern Lebanon in general, and south of the Litani in particular.

“It seems that this renewed presence and activity began to be detected by Israel's intelligence collection sensors. As is known, intelligence collection sensors are not airtight, and accordingly, counteraction efforts are not airtight either."

Beeri’s analysis of the findings showed the Radwan Unit’s repeated attempts to return and operate in southern Lebanon, “largely in a covert manner."

"As part of building its updated operational plans, the Radwan Unit is focusing on building readiness for carrying out targeted terrorist operations against the IDF's presence in southern Lebanon or for infiltrating into Israel,” he added.

“From details gathered from various reports about the eliminations of Radwan operatives in southern Lebanon, it is clear that the Radwan Unit is 'recalculating its course' and rebuilding its operational plans to be prepared to execute them."

According to Beeri, such actions could manifest in "an attempt to infiltrate a specific area of Israeli territory using small cells, carrying out an attack against IDF forces in Lebanon, and so on."

He emphasized the importance of maintaining the IDF's presence along the border, as well as stating that the deployment of the Lebanese Army didn’t provide any real deterrence or control.

"Recently, it was reported that the Lebanese Army is deployed in about 80% of the area south of the Litani River. However, it cannot be concluded that they control the entire area where they are deployed,” Beeri stated, adding that it was ‘highly doubtful’ that the Lebanese Army could deter the Radwan Unit in southern Lebanon.

Beeri concluded by calling for the preservation of security capabilities in the border communities.

"Alongside the IDF's preparation in southern Lebanon, it is necessary to preserve the ability of the border communities to defend themselves, maintaining the readiness of their response units as a last line of defense in situations where a small number of terrorists might infiltrate into the community."