'Back to square one': Rafael chairman, ex-minister Yuval Steinitz talks Iran, Israel's defenses

MILITARY AFFAIRS: Yuval Steinitz attributes much of Israel’s successful defense against Iranian attacks to Rafael’s multi-layered systems, such as the Iron Dome and David’s Sling.

When former government minister and chairman of the board of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Yuval Steinitz first realized that the long-expected confrontation with Iran would start soon, his first reaction wasn’t pride or vindication – but dread.

“First of all, there was deep anxiety,” he recalls. “Even if everything is planned and tested, this kind of decision is always a gamble. If it fails, the consequences could be catastrophic. Not only would we miss our objective, but we’d invite a devastating retaliation.”

For over two decades, Steinitz has been among the most influential figures in shaping Israel’s strategic posture toward Iran. A former chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, finance and intelligence minister, and a member of the security cabinet, he was among the key architects of the security doctrine that placed the Iranian nuclear program at the top of Israel’s national threat assessment.

In a special, wide-ranging conversation, Steinitz offers an unprecedented behind-the-scenes look at the deliberations over the years and the logic behind Israel’s recent strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure – a move he describes as “bolder and more effective than anything we’d ever seriously contemplated.”

Steinitz is quick to distinguish the operation from Israel’s past nuclear strikes in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007). “Those were precise, surgical attacks – one or two targets, short flights, minimal footprint,” he says. “Here, the concept was fundamentally different. We weren’t aiming to take out a single reactor – we were going for widespread chaos. Decapitate leadership, dismantle infrastructure, generate confusion.”

He notes that previous Israeli war plans, discussed in 2011-2012 while he was a member of Israel’s security cabinet, focused mainly on Natanz and possibly Fordow – two of Iran’s major enrichment facilities. “What we saw this time was an unprecedented strike: Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, Arak, centrifuge production factories, experimental labs, even nuclear research embedded in university facilities – all hit in rapid succession.”

The result? A delay of “at least two to four years” in Iran’s nuclear program, according to Steinitz. “That’s a dramatic setback. Especially in weaponization – what we call the ‘finalization’ phase. The enrichment they’d nearly mastered also suffered a setback. But the weaponization part? The parts and people needed to build the bomb: We might have wiped that clean.”

Yuval Steinitz's path from Netanyahu's cabinet to Rafael

STEINITZ IS uniquely positioned to contrast the current campaign with past decision points. In 2011-2012, a strike against Iran’s nuclear program was considered by an “eight-member forum” headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – but ultimately shelved. Then-defense Minister Ehud Barak later accused Steinitz, who was then finance minister, and fellow minister Moshe Ya’alon of “chickening out” at the last moment – and voting against the strike, a move that shelved the idea.

“That’s not accurate,” Steinitz says flatly. “We weren’t afraid – we were unconvinced. The plan on the table then would have delivered limited damage; maybe delayed Iran by a year or two, but not dismantled the program. And the costs? Hezbollah was at full strength, Iron Dome was barely operational, and the projected casualties in Israel ranged from 400 to over 1,000.”

In contrast, the recent operation reflected what he calls a “mature doctrine”: if you’re going to strike, do it thoroughly. “It’s not enough to hit 20 or 30 percent of the nuclear program. That kind of partial damage only strengthens their motivation to rebuild. You have to destroy 70, 80, even 90 percent – leave them facing a decision to start from scratch. That’s what changes their calculus.”

Quantifying the precise impact of the strike is difficult, Steinitz admits. “What metrics do you use? Physical infrastructure, number of centrifuges, amount of enriched uranium, scientific expertise lost?”

Still, his personal estimate is striking: “I’d say we damaged about 80% of the enrichment capacity and possibly 100% of the weaponization effort.”

The destruction wasn’t only physical. “We targeted the brains,” he explains. “Scientists, senior engineers, lab technicians – eliminated. Experimental facilities – obliterated. Fordow was partially hit, but Natanz was likely wiped out. The conversion facility at Isfahan, which takes uranium gas and prepares it for use in a weapon – that was hit, too.”

CRUCIALLY, STEINITZ believes the blow to Iran’s weaponization process may be nearly irreversible in the short term. “They weren’t far along – but now, they’re back to square one. Even if they have some enriched uranium left, they won’t be able to weaponize it for a long time.”

Beyond the offensive operation, Steinitz turns to what he calls Israel’s “underrated triumph”: its air defense systems. In particular, he emphasizes the role of Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, where he currently serves as chairman of the board.

“When people talk about the war, they focus on ballistic missiles, which some of them managed to hit Israel,” he says. “But let’s not forget – Iran launched around 1,200 drones and cruise missiles. And only one hit anything significant.”

According to Steinitz, that near-perfect interception rate – 99.9% – is unparalleled globally. “In Ukraine, they’re thrilled with a 40% interception rate. We had a single drone strike a building in Beit She’arim – that’s it. The rest were downed.”

He attributes much of that success to Rafael’s multi-layered systems, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and cutting-edge air-to-air missiles like the Python and Derby. “These are not only Israeli systems – they’re the best in the world,” he says with visible pride. “Even our American counterparts admit it behind closed doors. ‘we are the biggest’ they tell me – but you are the best.”

Perhaps Rafael’s most remarkable contribution is yet to fully deploy: the company’s high-energy laser interception system, based on a proprietary “adaptive optics” technology developed over the past five years.

“This is a game-changer,” Steinitz says. “For 60 years, the world has tried to build a functional laser defense system – and failed. The US, Russia, China: none succeeded. Rafael did.”

How Rafael broke through fundamental barriers

THE BREAKTHROUGH, he explains, lies in overcoming a fundamental barrier: the atmosphere. “Laser beams scatter in air. That’s why surgical lasers work at close range – but not over kilometers. Rafael’s adaptive optics technology compensates for atmospheric distortion in real time. It’s like creating a ‘smart laser’ that corrects itself mid-flight.”

In practical terms, this means intercepting artillery shells, drones, or rockets from up to 10 or even 20 kilometers away – instantly, at the speed of light, for pennies on the dollar.

“In Iron Dome, each interceptor costs around $100,000. David’s Sling costs $700,000 per shot. Arrow-3? Up to $4 million,” he says. “But a single laser interception? Just three dollars.”

But cost isn’t the only advantage. There’s also speed. “Lasers travel at the speed of light. There’s no delay, no chase. You shoot, and the missile explodes almost instantly – before it even reaches Israeli airspace.”

The result? A country that can intercept threats without triggering citywide alarms. “With Iron Dome, we sound sirens in Tel Aviv just in case interception fails. With lasers, the missile explodes above Gaza before it even becomes a threat. In many cases, citizens won’t even know they were targeted.”

If missile interception is one front for him, satire is another. And it turns out, Steinitz’s new book The Governmental Comedy is as much a commentary on government dysfunction as it is a personal memoir.

“The book is inspired by two people,” he says: “Henry Kissinger – former US secretary of state – for his deep philosophical reflection on diplomacy, and Ephraim Kishon – one of the most widely read contemporary satirists in Israel – for his brutal, hilarious critique of Israeli bureaucracy. I wanted to write something that captures both: the seriousness of security decisions and the absurdity of how they sometimes unfold.”

The result is a collection of stories that move between war rooms and wild bureaucratic drama. “Someone told me that it’s the most serious and most laugh-out-loud book ever written about Israel,” he says proudly.

“It was 2003. Then-prime minister Ariel Sharon replaced the Shas Party (A religious Sephardic one) with Shinui (a secular party). Suddenly, there were too many Ashkenazim [Jews of Central and Eastern Europe ancestry] in government. I was bumped to make room. So I said, okay, make me chair of Foreign Affairs and Defense. It was supposed to be a consolation prize but became one of the most important roles I ever held.”

Steinitz clear-eyed on Israeli security failures

DESPITE THE humor, Steinitz is clear-eyed about the failures of Israel’s security establishment – especially regarding October 7, 2023.

“For 25 years after the Oslo Accords, nobody seriously considered the possibility of a military-style Palestinian incursion into Israeli territory. Not from the PA, not from Hamas,” he says. “I published an article in 1998 predicting such a scenario, but it was dismissed. Even I started doubting it might happen.”

He points to systemic arrogance within military intelligence. “Who was I, a former Golani sergeant, to question an IDF major-general? But that’s the problem. Civilian oversight is viewed as interference, not as a safeguard.”

His account of the 2007 Syrian nuclear reactor is a case in point. As chairman of the Intelligence Subcommittee, he raised alarms that were initially ignored by the Mossad and Aman (Military Intelligence Directorate). “They said there was nothing. But we insisted, and eventually the reactor was exposed by the Mossad.”

Steinitz is no stranger to internal cabinet battles, some of which appear in his book. During Operation Protective Edge (2014), he led a push to launch a ground invasion of Gaza and dismantle Hamas entirely.

“They had only 10,000 fighters back then – no tunnel networks, nothing like today,” he says. “The security establishment warned it would be a disaster. I argued that if we didn’t act then, we’d pay a much higher price later – and here we are.”

As a former finance minister, Steinitz recalls in the book other unexpected victories. “People thought the two-year budget idea was crazy. Today, Israel is the only country in the world that adopted it – and it helped us rank first in the IMF’s post-2008 crisis recovery index.” He smiles at the irony. “Despite all the chaos, we manage to function. Maybe it’s not because of the system, but despite it.”

His book, in this sense, is not only a chronicle – it’s a therapeutic journey. “After I retired, I could finally see the comedy in it all,” he says. “Yes, we were dealing with life-and-death decisions. But sometimes, the process looked like something out of ‘Yes, Minister.’”